Against this background of rapid economic development, Japanese fertility dropped sharply ( fig. 1 ). The crude birth rate, which had been about 35 in the late l940s, first dipped below 30 in 1950; 5 years later it fell below 20 and stayed there. Fertility decline in Japan began about 1920, but the rate of decline accelerated after By the early 1960s
the persistent decline appears to have ended, and then the leveling off began. A sharp drop in fertility in 1966 in response to the superstition of Hinoeuma vividly underscores that fertility is very much within the realm of deliberate control.4 Birth rates just before and after 1966 were to some extent adjustments to the 1966 phenomenon.
Rural regions experienced a more rapid and a more persistent birth rate decline than industrial areas (see table 1 ). Only part of this difference is accounted for by shifts in age composition as women of childbearing age migrated from rural to urban regions.5 Until 1962, the average number of children ever born by duration of marriage for women married before they were 30 years old continuously declined for all groups (see table 2 ). There was a slight increase between 1962 and 1967 among women married less than 10 years. But completed fertility measured approximately by the fertility of women married more than 10 years continued to decline. Table 3 provides more direct evidence on the decrease in desired completed fertility during the postwar years, 1950-6 7.
For families already having two children, the proportion desiring no additional children increased throughout the years, while the proportion desiring two and three or more additional children continued to decline. Moreover, the percentage of couples with "no idea" how many additional children they wanted tended to decline, suggesting an increased Souacas.-Japan Ministry of Health and Welfare (1970, vol. I) and Japan Prime Minister's Office (1970) . N0TE.-Industrial regions included are Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka, Kanagawa, Fukuoka, and Aichi prefectures. Rural regions included arc Aomori, Yamagata, Niigata, Ibaragi, and
Kumamoto prefectures. Classification of prefectures as industrial or rural-farm is from Honda (1959) . Crude birth rates for regions are simple averages of birth rates in each prefecture. Percent changes in crude birth rates for regions are simple averages of the percent changes in each prefecture. awareness of family planning in later years. My estimates of completed fertility (table 3) also show a pronounced decline over the years.6
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The rapid decline in fertility in the postwar years coincided with the liberalization of policies on abortions and contraceptive use. Abortion was first legalized in September 1948, and in June 1949, grounds for abortion and sterilization were extended. After May 1952, abortion could be obtained with only the consent of man and wife. Alarmed at the increased number of abortions and possible health hazards from abortion, the government in 1952 initiated programs to disseminate birth control information through local agencies. Resort to abortion continued to increase, however, until 1957 , when the number of abortions per 100 live births reached its peak of 71.6.
IlL Economic Framework for Fertility Analysis
The following discussion will emphasize the effect of parental education on fertility. The testing of economic hypotheses about the effect of parental education on fertility also provides a test of the usefulness of economic theory in interpreting Japanese fertility behavior.
The basic proposition in the economic theory of fertility is that observed changes and differentials in fertility reflect to a large extent changes and differentials in the demand for fertility and that resource constraints on 6 The true decline is likely to have been even more rapid than these estimates suggest because my calculations may underestimate completed fertility to a greater extent in earlier years. First, the true mean of the open-ended class would be larger than three, the figure used for my calculations, by a larger amount in earlier years if completed fertility declined over time. Second, the group with "no idea" as to number of additional children desired was omitted from the calculations. If people gave the "no idea" answer because of greater ignorance (lower level of education) than other respondents, then economic analysis predicts their desired completed fertility to be greater than that of others. This omission would have mattered less in recent years because of general declines in fertility and because this group made up a smaller fraction of respondents in more recent years. (1960) , most economic models of fertility view children as primarily consumer durables. In this conception, a flow of services emanates from the stock of children, and these services enter the parents' utility function. Since parents must make outlays (e.g., food, clothing, housing, and, most important, their time) to obtain child services, they are not free goods, but command a price. To be quite general, therefore, demand for fertility is determined by the preferences of parents, the resources available to parents, and the cost of producing child services relative to the cost of other commodities (usually identified collectively as the standard of living) that also yield utility.7
Typically, the fertility rate has declined in countries experiencing sustained growth in real income. Since growth in real income is usually brought about by growth in real wages, this phenomenon may be interpreted as reflecting the dominance of substitution over income effects. An increase in real income would, other things being equal, increase the number of children per family unless the number of children was an "inferior good."8 Assuming that child services are more time-intensive for mothers than the standard of living, an increase in the wife's wage rate would raise the relative price of child services, imparting a substitution effect away from them.9 Relying on income and wage rates alone, one may, therefore, interpret the decline in fertility accompanying growth in real income as reflecting the dominance of the substitution effect of a rise in the wife's wage rate over the combined income effects of increases in both spouses' wage rates. However, both income and wage rates are correlated with the educational levels of the parents and the level of contraceptive knowledge, relationships which complicate the empirical estimation of the magnitudes of the income and substitution effects. The effect of educational attainment of parents on fertility has been investigated more thoroughly than that of income or wage rates by BenPorath (1970a BenPorath ( , l970b, 1973 and Michael (1971) among others. Educational attainment of parents is typically negatively associated with their Most models use the tune-allocation framework (Becker 1965) and they are usually cast in a lifetime dimension, thereby avoiding the complexities of timing and spacing of births (see, for example, Ben-Porath [1973] , DeTray [1972 ], Michael [1971 , and Willis [1973] ). Some problems with the use of static models are discussed by T. Paul Schultz (1973).
8 Also relevant to the decline in fertility are changes in the quality of children as real income rises. Research on the demand for consumer durables suggests that the effect of income on the demand for quality is greater than on the demand for quantity. Even assuming numbers of children are not inferior, parents would tend to a greater extent to spend more per child than to have more children as real income rises.
9An increase in the husband's wage rate, however, is expected to produce mainly income effects because his time intensities are assumed to differ little between child services and the standard of living and because his wage income constitutes a large proportion of family income (see, for example, Ben-Porath [1973] fertility. Proposed explanations of this relationship fall generally into three groups: the tastes hypothesis, the cost-of-fertility-control hypothesis, and the cost-of-time hypothesis.
According to one version of the tastes hypothesis, parents with higher education may be more "rational" than others in that they tend to regard the number of children as a decision variable, while less educated parents regard it as something beyond their control (Ben-Porath 1970b). Therefore, parents with higher levels of education would control fertility more and have fewer children than other parents. Another version is that education affects the perception of child quality (Ben-Porath 1970b , Gardner 1972 . Parents with more education may desire a greater expenditure per child to obtain a given level of child quality. Other things being equal, they will have a smaller number of children. Economists have not succeeded in incorporating such taste factors in their theory in ways that generate testable hypotheses. Such taste factors are still regarded as residuals.
The second explanation hypothesizes that parents with more education have better access to information about birth control devices and are more efficient at using them. In other words, education lowers the cost of fertility control. More educated parents would engage in fertility control to a greater extent than other parents, other things, particularly the benefit of control, being the same. This hypothesis may partly explain the negative association between education and fertility.'0
The third explanation emphasizes the effect of education on fertility through its effects on the cost of time. In the time-allocation framework of the fertility model, education is assumed to raise the productivity of time spent at home in the production of commodities (such as child services and the standard of living) as well as that of time spent in the labor force. An increase in the productivity of time at work leads to an increased real wage rate, thereby raising the relative prices of timeintensive commodities. An increase in the productivity at home, say, at the same rate for all commodities, lowers the relative prices of timeintensive commodities. An increased productivity at home or market also results in increased real income, imparting income effects. The full effect of education on the demand for children is the net of these forces. To rely on the cost-of-time hypothesis to explain the negative correlation between education and fertility, one must argue that the substitution 10 More educated people may also use birth control more than others because they desire fewer children, i.e., the benefit of birth control is greater for them. Both Becker (1960, p.2 18) and Ben-Porath (19706, p.6) propose a test of the hypothesis that education lowers the cost of fertility control. If improvement in birth control techniques comes as a once-and-for-all change, then fertility differentials among educational groups would widen at first but would tend to narrow over time as information on birth control measures became more diffused (see Section IV below for some evidence of a differential rate of diffusion among educational groups of birth control techniques in Japan after 1948-52).
effect imparted by education outweighs the income effect. One plausible case is that education, especially of the wife, raises the productivity of time spent in the market more than that of time spent in producing child services or the standard of living. In this case, the relative price of child services rises, causing substitution effects away from them." The substitution effect of the husband's education is likely to be small, assuming that time intensity varies little between the two commodities for him. The husband's education is expected, therefore, to exert mainly income effects (Ben-Porath 1973) .
The cost-of-time hypothesis has played a central role in the economic analysis qf fertility. It emphasizes the role of the relative price of child services, and its predictions are empirically distinguishable, at least for Japan, from those of the tastes and the cost-of-fertility-control hypotheses. The latter two hypotheses predict that the education of either parent will be negatively associated with fertility, but they leave the relative importancé of the effects of each parent's education an empirical question. In Japan, where the husband apparently dominates family decisionmaking,'2 one would expect his education to be at least as important as the wife's education, if not more so. The cost-of-time hypothesis predicts that the negative association between education and fertility is more strongly manifested when the education variable refers to the wife's rather than the husband's education. The husband's education would be positively correlated, if anything, with fertility when other things, in particular the level of contraceptive knowledge, are the same. In other words, husband's education serves as a proxy for family wealth, while wife's education represents the price of child services.
These three hypotheses, however, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They help identify possible mechanisms through which parents' education affects fertility. For example, the cost-of-time and the cost-offertility-control hypotheses would best be viewed not as alternatives but as complementary hypotheses. The cost-of-time hypothesis emphasizes forces affecting the demand for the service of birth control, a demand which is derived from the desired reduction in births, given the level of fecundity. Underlying this demand is the demand for fertility. The costof-fertility-control hypothesis emphasizes the supply side, or the cost of " Even if the wife does not work in the market in her lifetime, her shadow price of time could be increased by education, making child services more expensive (see Gronau [1971] ). 12 A survey of 422 couples in the Saitama prefecture in 1960 showed that 76 percent were using condoms, a device for the husband's use, and that 62 percent had the husband obtain the contraceptives. The same study showed that for 70 percent of white-collar workers, 52 percent of farmers, and 51 percent of laborers, the husband was responsible for obtaining contraceptive devices (Muramatsu 1962) . Matsuinoto, Koizumi, and Nohara (1972, p. 254 ) also report that husbands are primarily responsible for decisions concerning family limitation.
POSTWAR FERTILITY IN JAPAN
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IV. Empirical Analysis
Study of Japan appears to offer an opportunity to obtain evidence concerning both the effects on fertility of decreases in the cost of preventing births and changes in fertility demand. Thus, I want below first to examine evidence concerning the proposition that both decreased demand for fertility and increased access to abortions and contraceptive techniques contributed to the phenomenal postwar decline in Japanese fertility.
Abortion, Contraceptive Use, and Fertility
The rapid decline in Japanese fertility in the postwar decade coincided, as I have stated, with abortion liberalization measures and the subsequent dissemination of information about other means of fertility control. It is tempting to explain the rapid decline in fertility as simply the result of a widespread resort to abortion. According to this view, many births prior to abortion legalization were unwanted: the liberalization of birthcontrol policies simply eliminated this excess fertility. In other words, if abortion had not been legalized, fertility would not have declined appreciably. But since fertility in Japan had been declining persistently since around 1920, there is a presumption that it would have declined even in the absence of abortion reform.
Since abortions and other fertility-control measures entail costs, both monetary and nonmonetary, the extent of use of these measures presumably was influenced by considerations of gains and costs. Abortion legalization and birth control information programs certainly decreased the costs of fertility control, leading to increased use of control measures.
On the demand side, as discussed in Section III, the main determinant of the demand for fertility control is the demand for fertility. A fuller interpretation of the developments in Japan would be that the price of child services increased and demand for fertility declined, leading to an increased demand for fertility control, and that the increased availability of birth control measures and abortions facilitated the attainment of lower fertility. Put differently, even without the liberalization of abortion and other control policies, resort to illegal abortion and the use of contraceptives would have grown because of the increase in the price of child services. In fact, the availability of illegal abortions had been growing before 1948, and the Eugenics Law of 1948 was motivated by hygienics, not by intent of population control (Muramatsu 1967) . In short, legalization and liberalization of control measures were not so much autonomous Si8o JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY events as responses by authorities to increased demand for fertility control and the health hazards of illegal practices.
How much did legalization of abortion contribute to the rapid decline in fertility? To answer this question accurately, one would have to estimate (1) the increase in the number of abortions caused by abortion legalization, and (2) the proportion of those abortions that would have terminated in births had there been no lcgal abortions. Since such estimates are beyond the scope of this paper,1 3 J report the results of a crude calculation. Assuming that all pregnancies aborted legally would have terminated in live births if abortions had been illegal, I calculated, for each year from 1949 to 1961, the "maximum" general fertility rate as births plus abortions per 1,000 women of ages iO-49.'4 The excess of actual fertility decline over any decline in the "maximum" fertility rate can be viewed as a measure of fertility decline due to abortion.
Between the 1949-5 1 and 1959-61 periods, the actual general fertility rate dropped by 44 percent, from 93 to 52. According to my calculations, the "maximum" general fertility rate decreased by 22 percent, from 111 to 87. Thus, it would appear that abortions about doubled the rate of decline in the general fertility rate during the decade after 1950.1 5 But resort to abortion by no means accounted for the entire fertility decline.
Indeed, the rate of decline in the estimated "maximum" rate is still substantially greater than the rate of decline in the actual fertility rate during the prewar years.'6 This evidence of a substantial fertility decline-indeed, a possible acceleration of the prewar decline-after adjusting for the effect of abortions suggests that the actual fertility decline partly represents decreases in the demand for fertility. 13 In principle, effects of legal abortions on fertility in any year could be assessed from a simultaneous-equations model in which key çndogenous variables would be the fertility rate and prices of abortions and of contraceptive measures. Once the effect of legalization on the prices of abortions and contraceptive measures was estimated, the ultimate effect on fertility could be obtained from the demand-for-fertility function.
These are maximum estimates for each year of the fertility rate in the absence of legal abortions because, if abortions had been illegal, some pregnancies would have been aborted illegally or prevented by other means. In other words, the abortions in each year were not solely due to decreases in costs but also to increases in the demand for fertility control. On the other hand, these estimates may understate the true maximum values because of underreporting of abortions. Muramatsu (1960) estimated that in 1955 at most 77 percent of induced abortions performed were reported. He also estimated that in 1955 the number of live births in the absence of abortion would have been twice (or more) the number actually registered. I calculated the ratio of the maximum to the actual general fertility rate to be 1.68 in 1955.
Because of the underreporting of abortions, my calculations may overstate the effect of abortions on fertility decline. Since the underreporting was probably greater in earlier years, the actual drop in the max mum fertility rates would have been greater, and the effect of abortions on fertility decline smaller than I calculate. 16 Between 1920 and 1940, the rate of decline per decade in the general fertility rate was about 13 percent. Souacss.-Pregnancies, births, and abortions from Shinozaki (1971) ; female population composition from Japan Prime Minister't Office (1955 ( , 196Db, 1965 . NOTE-Rate of Pregnancy = 1000 x (births + fetal deaths + abortions)/married women of childbearing age with husband present. Share of births = (births/pregnancies) x 100. Share of abortions = (abortions/pregnancies) a 100. Regions are the same as in table 1.
Dissemination of birth-control measures other than abortions undoubtedly played some role in the decline in actual fertility rates, but in the absence of estimates of the number of pregnancies prevented by the use of modern contraceptive measures, one cannot directly assess its impact on fertility. Since the efforts to disseminate birth-control information started only in 1952, the major effects of birth control on fertility were probably felt during the late 1950s. Assuming that most couples with accidental pregnancies turned to abortion as a last resort to control fertility, the share of abortions compared with the share of actual births in total pregnancies may provide information on the trend of fertility demand and the use of contraceptives. Since abortions had already become widespread by the middle of the 1950s, subsequent changes in the share of abortions would reflect, to a large extent, an increased use of contraceptives. Table 4 summarizes trends and differentials in the rate of pregnancy and in the shares of abortions and births in pregnancies after 1955. There was a general increase of the share of births and a decrease of the share of abortions in total pregnancies. For Japan as a whole, the pregnancy rate among fertile women declined at an average 5-year rate of 14 percent from 1955 to 1965. The rate of decline was greater in the rural regions (21 percent) than in the industrial regions (6 percent).
Indeed, by 1960 the pregnancy rate in rural regions had dropped below that in industrial regions. During the 10-year period, the rate of increase in the share of births and the rate of decrease in the share of abortions were both greater in industrial than in rural regions, suggesting that "unwanted" pregnancies declined more rapidly in industrial areas.
What can one infer from these regional differences? Suppose that all these differences are attributable to the differential spread of contraceptive methods (i.e., differential reduction in costs of control). Then the implicit assumption would be either that there was no change in demand for fertility in industrial and rural regions, or that the decline in demand for fertility did not vary systematically between the two types of regions.
The slower rate of increase in the share of births and the slower rate of decrease in the share of abortions in rural regions would then presumably be attributable mostly to a slower spread of contraceptive measures in these regions. The more rapid decline of the pregnancy rate in rural regions, however, is the opposite of what one would expect if contraceptive measure did spread more slowly in these regions. Therefore, a more plausible interpretation of these differences would rely on a combination of differential change in fertility demand and differential spread of contraceptive knowledge. One interpretation would be that fertility demand declined more rapidly in rural than in industrial regions, resulting in a more rapid decline of the pregnancy rate, but that the spread of contraceptive knowledge was not rapid enough in rural regions to diminish rapidly the use of abortions as a last resort to control fertility. Although the changing age composition of females precludes a firm judgment about the validity of the above interpretation,' this interpretation is supported by a comparison of the 1955-60 and 1960-65 periods.
The pregnancy rate dropped more rapidly during 1955-60 than it did during 1960-65 in both regions. If this was attributable entirely to the spread of contraceptive measures, one would also expect to observe more rapid changes in both the share of births and the share of abortions in the earlier period. Indeed, given the early I 950s' reforms regarding the use of contraceptives, this expectation would appear to be quite plausible, but the course of events was just the opposite as both shares changed more rapidly in the later period (table 4) . Again, a more plausible interpretation would be that demand for fertility continued to decline in both periods; that the spread of contraceptives increasingly facilitated effective
The industrial prefectures experienced a slight increase and the rural prefectures a rather large decrease in the proportion of women of childbearing age (table 4). These changes in age composition undoubtedly explain in part the more rapid decline in the pregnancy rate in the rural than in the industrial prefectures. fertility control, thereby reducing unwanted pregnancies; and that the role of abortion continued to diminish in importance as a control measure.
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The above evidence documents an increased use of contraceptive measures from 1955 to 1965. The relationship between parents' education and the use of contraceptives was discussed in Section III irs the form of the cost-of-fertility-control hypothesis. If there was a period in which the use of birth control techniques was introduced or improved once and for all, then this hypothesis predicts that differences among education groups in the extent of use of birth control would widen at first, then narrow gradually. In Japan, a marked increase in the availability of abortions and birth control information occurred after 1948-52, so this period would appear to provide a reasonably proper setting for testing this hypothesis. Table 5 presents the percentage of families within education class (husband's or wife's) that reported using some birth-control technique. The data are taken from surveys conducted in selected years to determine the attitudes of Japanese families of various socioeconomic classes toward contraceptive usage. In most education classes, the proportion of families using birth-control techniques increased over the years, presumably because costs of control declined and benefits increased. The differences across education groups in the extent of contraceptive usage as measured by either the range or the mean absolute deviation (relative to the mean) varied most in the early 1950s and persistently declined after 1952. One detects a slight increase in these measures of dispersion in 1952 with the S184 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY start of the campaign to disseminate birth-control information. These findings, though based on sparse information, agree with the predictions of the cost-of-fertility-control hypothesis.
Education and Fertility
The preceding discussion suggests that a decline in fertility demand and increased access to abortions and birth-control information played a joint role in producing the observed decrease in fertility in Japan. 1 now explore the relationship between fertility and parental education in the light of the hypotheses discussed in Section III.
According to the tastes and cost-of-fertility-control hypotheses, education of either parent is expected to be negatively associated with fertility. For Japan, education of the husband, because of his dominant family role, is likely to be a more significant explanatory variable than is the wife's education. The cost-of-time hypothesis predicts that the husband's education will be weakly, but positively, associated with fertility and that the wife's education will have a strong negative association with fertility. Table 6 presents a measure of completed fertility by education groups for 1940, 1952, 1962, and 1967 . The data are from Institute of Population Problems surveys. Education of either parent generally is negatively associated with fertility, in agreement with findings for other countries. These data also document the persistently declining trend in completed fertility at all levels of parental education, underscoring that education is by no means the only factor contributing to the decline in completed fertility over time. The negative association of fertility and the education of either parent may at first appear to agree with the prediction of the tastes and the costof-fertility-control hypotheses. Unfortunately, these data are not crossclassified by education of parents, so that one cannot discern the "pure" relationship between the fertility rate and the wife's and husband's education separately. Since the levels of husband's and wife's education are (positively) correlated, table 6 reflects the joint influence of both levels of education. Since the correlation is not perfect, one may still attempt (see table 7) to determine the relative importance of the education of either parent in "explaining" observed differences in fertility. Table 7 presents the observed completed fertility in the 4 survey years and estimates of completed fertility obtained by using the 1967 distribution of educational attainment of husband and wife. That the general increase in the level of school attainment played a role in the decline in observed fertility is demonstrated by standardized rates which are consistently lower than actual rates in every year. The difference between standardized fertility rates using husband's and wife's education appears to narrow in later years. One reason for this tendency may be the increased correlation of husband's and wife's educational attainment accompanying a general increase in the dispersion and level of women's educational attainment. According to the mean absolute deviation of yearly values from the 1967 value (shown in table 7), the year-by-year differences in the fertility rate are decreased when yearly rates are standardized by education of either parent, but the reduction is somewhat greater when the distribution of the wife's rather than of the husband's education is used. Standardizing by the husband's education reduces the mean absolute deviation by 12.8 percent; standardizing by the wife's education decreases it by 15.3 percent. Thus, the trend in the distribution of the wife's education appears to have been more important than that of the husband's in the fertility trend.
Since the data for table 7 were not cross-classified by parents' education, one could not directly observe the "pure" effect of the education of either Sz86 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY parent. To determine the relative magnitudes of the pure effects of parents' education on fertility, multiple regressions of the following form were estimated using cross-section data for 46 prefectures: C = a + bl(EdHN) + b2(EdHH) + cl(EdWN) + c2(EdWH) +f(other variables) + u, where C = fertility rate; EdHN = proportion of males who never attended school; EdHH = proportion of males who completed approximately 10 or more years of schooling; EdWN = the same as EdHN, for females; EdWH = the same as EdHN, for females; other variables = other standardizing variables discussed in the text; and u = disturbance term. Since time-series data on education and other variables are lacking for Japan, as for many other countries, the regression analysis was restricted to cross-section data. Regressions reported in table 8 use the average number of children ever born for selected age groups of women (completed fertility) as the dependent variable; in regressions in table 9 the live birth rate is the dependent variable. The Japanese census presents the distribution of educational attainment in four categories-none, elementary, middle, and high. Instead of estimating a single measure of educational attainment, such as the mean or median, I used two categories of the education variable for each parent. One advantage in using these measures is that the coefficients, that is, b1 and b2 for the husband and c5 and c2 for the wife, may reveal differential effects on fertility of a shift in the education distribution between the lower and the upper segments of the distribution. The expected signs of the regression coefficients 
Regressions of Completed Fertility
For the regressions of completed fertility reported in table 8, each observation was weighted by the square root of the number of agespecific ever-married women in each prefecture. In addition to the education variables, standardizing variables included in these regressions are the percentage of persons, age 15 and older, employed in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, and the percentage of the population living in urban areas. These variables refer to 1960 and therefore do not reflect accurately the background in which the couples made fertility decisions. For these variables to have substantive meaning, one must assume that the majority of couples have lived in the prefecture they resided in in 1960
for most of their married lives and that the rankings of prefectures by these variables have not changed significantly over time. Unfortunately, is the birth rate in the ith age class for all women in Japan, Wij is the proportion of Women in the ith age class in the 1th prefecture (i = 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55+) . Monthly earnings are average monthly contract wages and salaries for household head (male) and average monthly Contract wages and salaries for wife and other household members (female) in 1959, each is deflated by a regional price index. Labor-force participation rates are percents gcs of populations ages 15 + in the labor force in 1960.
.c .05.
< .01. neither income nor earnings is held constant in these regressions for lack of data pertaining to these age groups.
Regressions 1 and 2 were run for married women, ages 40-49 and 50-59, respectively. No coefficient in regression 1 is significant. The ambiguous result obtained for this cohort may be partly because the majority of these women were married during World War II times. Uncertainty about the future and participation by males in war activities may have distorted family-size decision making. The sizes of the regression coefficients for the education variables satisfy the weaker prediction of the cost-of-time hypothesis, however. For regression 2, the results are less ambiguous.
Judging from the t-values, both Ed,, N and EdWN are significant at the 1 percent level, and the F-values for the education variables indicate that both the husband's and the wife's education are statistically significant at better than 1 percent. Both husband's and wife's education obtain regression coefficients that are largely consistent with the cost-of-time hypothesis.
To determine if the fertility relationships for the two groups of married women were different, I tested three null hypotheses using Chow's (1960) test for equality of two regressions. The three null hypotheses were that (1) the two relationships are completely the same; (2) the two relationships are the same except for the intercept; and (3) the two relationships are the same only with respect to the education variables. The first null hypothesis was rejected (F77, = 10.93), but the latter two were accepted. Based on these findings, I pooled the observations for the two groups and obtained regressions 3 and 4. Regression 3 assumes that only the intercept differs, while regression 4 assumes that everything except the education coefficients differs between the two groups. The results for pooled regressions 3 and 4 are quite similar. Both husband's and wife's education are statistically significant at better than 1 percent, with regression coefficients as expected from the cost-of-time hypothesis.
The results of these regressions clearly support the economic framework based on the cost-of-time hypothesis. According to the coefficients of the pooled regressions, male education variables higher by one standard deviation unit, holding female education constant, are associated with higher fertility by about 0.13 children. Holding male education constant, female education variables higher by one standard deviation are associated with about 0.30 fewer children. However, the relationship between education and fertility is apparently nonlinear. The distribution of either parent's educational attainment has a greater effect on average completed fertility when it shifts from no education to some education than when it shifts from some to high education.5' While influences of 18 Ben-Porath (1973) reported a similar finding for Israel. In particular, the sharpest decline in fertility was observed between women with no education and women with some education. r Sigo JOURNAL OF POLITICAL P education on fertility through tastes and the cost of fertility control are undoubtedly present, the dominant influences appear to be through ino come and prices. r These regressions refer to families which made fertility decisions before e and during World War II. One would expect the decision-making process to have been more male-dominated in these than in postwar years. Yet female education is one of the most important variables in these regressions, a finding which strongly supports the relevance of the economic analysis of fertility. For this paper, regressions of completed fertility could not be -run for families making fertility decisions during the postwar years, since the 1970 census was not available for all prefectures. As an alternative, I now turn to regressions of live birth rates in 1960.
Regressions of Live-Birth Rates
Multiple regressions of the number of live births in 1960 per thousand married women, age 15 or older, are reported in table 9. In addition to the percentage employed in agriculture and the percentage living in urban areas, these regressions hold constant the age composition of women and, in some cases, wage rates and labor-force participation rates. The age-composition variable is a weighted average of age-specific birth rates for Japan, the weights being the percentage of women in each age class in each prefecture. The percentage distributions of all women rather than of only married women were used because the latter may reflect endogenous decisions about the timing and duration of marriage. Both the female wage rate and the female labor-force participation rate are expected to affect fertility negatively. The male wage rate and the ,male labor-force participation rate would capture income effects and are expected, therefore, to obtain positive regression coefficients.
The results for the birth-rate regressions are largely consistent with the predictions of the cost-of-time hypothesis. An increase in male education, holding constant female education, increases, and an increase in female education, holding constant male education, decreases the birth rate. Female education is always more significant than male education.
Female education tends to remain statistically significant with negative effects on fertility even after the female wage rate and labor-force participation rate, either separately or together, are introduced in the regressions. As expected, the female wage rate obtains negative and significant regression coefficients. The male wage rate obtains coefficients that are insignificant, though with expected signs. Neither the agricultural employment nor the urbanization variable has significant coefficients, perhaps because urban-rural differences in birth rates had largely Adding wage-rate variables to the regressions greatly reduces the effect of female education on the birth rate. Without the wage-rate variables in regressions 1 and 3, a uniform percentage shift upward in the female education distribution reduces the birth rate by about 10, for example, -3.279 -6.322 = -9.6 for regression 1, but the magnitude drops to about five when the wage-rate variables are introduced in regressions 2 and 4. This finding is not surprising since the cost-of-time effects are likely to be captured jointly by female education and wage rates. The female wage rate also reduces the magnitude and significance of the female labor-force participation rate, as expected if decisions about fertility and labor supply are made simultaneously on the basis of the wage rate.19 The nonlinearity usually observed in the effects of female education is observed only when wage rates are held constant. Otherwise, the results are ambiguous: the deterrent effect of female education appears greater when education increases from some to high than from none to some schooling, though the regression coefficients for "high" are never statistically significant.
These regressions suggest that area differences in the birth rate reflect differences in the female variables more than in the male variables. For example, according to regression 2, increasing all the male variables by one standard deviation unit, holding constant other variables, increases births per thousand married women by about three, but similar increases in female variables decrease the birth rate by 10. Calculations for regression 4 show the effect of male variables to be + 1.2 and the effect of female variables to be -10.9.
V. Summary and Agenda
Increased access to abortions in Japan undoubtedly contributed to the post-World War II acceleration of that country's decline in fertility. But I conclude that fertility would still have declined at a more rapid rate than in the prewar period, which had been characterized by a mild and rather monotonic decline, if abortion had not been legalized. Therefore, dissemination of contraceptive information and/or an accelerated decline in the demand for fertility must also have contributed to the trend.
Cross-section analyses of 1960 data reveal that the economic theory of fertility, with its emphasis on the effects of female education and earning power on fertility demand, provides a useful framework for analyzing fertility differentials in Japan. In particular, regressions of completed fertility and live birth rates in 1960 show that female education and earnings affect fertility negatively and are the most significant variables in the regressions. Male education and earnings tend to have positive but less significant effects. On the basis of only sociological, demographic, or taste considerations, one would not necessarily expect to find female education more important than male education in explaining fertility differentials. Indeed, in Japan, because of the male's generally dominant role in household decisions, one would have expected to find male education to be at least as relevant as female education, if not more so, in explaining fertility differences.
How useful are these results in interpreting the fertility trends in Japan?
A tentative answer can be obtained from the regressions in table 9.
Assuming that the parameter estimates remain stable over time and using the observed magnitudes of change between 1950 and 1960 for all the explanatory variables except for the age-composition variable, my results predict the decline of births per thousand married women to be only 4 percent at the mean according to regression 2, and 3 percent according to regression 4. The actual decline between 1950 and 1960 was about 42 percent, of which one would hope to explain about half if legalization of abortion explains another half. For the period 1960-70, both regressions predict a decline, while in fact births per thousand married women increased somewhat. On the basis of these results, one may be inclined to doubt the usefulness of cross-section regressions in interpreting the trend.2° However, since the regression models and the economic hypotheses underlying them pertain to long-run adjustments, one would expect from these regressions better predictions of longer-term changes in fertility. It is possible that the sharp decline of fertility during the 1950s and the subsequent leveling off in the 1960s represent swings around a longer-term trend that has persisted since l920.21 If so, a more appropriate cornparison of actual and predicted declines might be made between 1950 and 1970. The predicted decline for this period was 19 percent according to regression 2 and 15 percent according to regression 4. The actual decline was about 30 percent. These regressions appear, therefore, to be more helpful in providing an interpretation of the longer-term fertility 20T. Paul Schultz (1973) discusses problems in the interpretation of time series from cross-section estimates of parameters. Here I ignore the kinds of problems he raised, :\ similar observation is made by Okazaki (1970, p. 26 decline in terms of price and income variables, but they are not likely to facilitate understanding of the shorter-term movements by which the decline may actually occur.
In table 10 some of the salient features of the United States and Japanese experiences during the postwar years are compared. If the economic framework for fertility analysis has general validity, it would predict more rapid fertility changes for countries experiencing more rapid changes in their economies. Clearly, both the economic variables examined and fertility rates changed more rapidly in Japan than in the United States during 1950-69 . A similar point is observed if one confines the comparison to the periods in which fertility declined: 1950-60 for Japan and 1960-69 for the United States.
Much more work is needed before we fully understand the reasons for the possible acceleration in the decline of fertility demand in Japan in the l950s and the leveling off in the l960s. A promising area for investigation is the interaction of the demands for quality and quantity of children in Japan. There may have been an accelerated substitution of quality for quantity during the postwar years because of income effects.
I am much in sympathy with Hashimoto's hypotheses. There is considerable evidence to suggest that control of fertility within marriage was widespread long before 1948, and I do find stress on the cost of female time provocative.3 At the same time, I do not think Hashimoto's various analyses are altogether persuasive. For example, if instead of using maximum crude birth rates and maximum general-fertility rates, maximum total-fertility rates for 1950 and 1960 are calculated, it appears that the practice of abortion. might very well have tripled the rate of fertility decline.4 The decline in the estimated maximum total-fertility rate between 1950 and 1960 is 16.8 percent. This is only a modest acceleration of the 12.6 percent rate of decline exhibited in the actual fertility rates between 1930 and 1940. An acceleration of this magnitude might easily be explained by the diffusion of modern contraceptive techniques during the l950s.. This mild acceleration might also be viewed as a reaction to the much higher-than-trend total-fertility rates between 1940 and 1950. Thus, it would appear that if Hashimoto wishes to stress the role of demand factors in the acceleration of Japanese fertility decline, he more than likely cannot avoid an inquiry into the extent to which legal abortions were substitutes for older forms of birth control.
Regardless of the magnitude of the acceleration remaining to be explained by some factor other than the legalization of abortion, I am not satisfied with Hashimoto's analysis of the spread of contraception. That the share of abortions in total births is high and rising in the rural regions of Japan in the presence of a sharply declining pregnancy rate can be taken as evidence that the spread of contraception is not sufficient to explain fertility changes unexplained by the legalization of abortion only if (1) abortion as a technique of birth control is already completely diffused, and (2) abortion is viewed as a technique of last resort.5 I doubt either of the above conditions held for Japan during the l950s. Abortion diffused throughout Japan in much the same manner and only slightly in advance of modern contraception. At any point during that decade, for any age cohort, the better educated a couple and the larger the city in which a couple lived, the higher the probability they had experienced an abortion. Among couples who had never practiced contraception, the probability of an abortion experience was relatively low. Significantly, high rates of abortion were found among couples who had practiced contraception and for one reason or another discontinued a discussion of the history of birth control in Japan, see Honjo (1941) .
The maximum total fertility rates in 1950 and 1960 are 4.16 and 3.46 . I have calculated these rates with data taken fromJapan Ministry of Health and Welfare (1967) and Aoki (1967) .
The industrial-rural dichotomy presented in Hashimoto's table 4 is based on a comparison of six urban prefectures with five rural ones. As an alternative, the share of induced abortions among pregnancies of Japanese women not living in cities of 50,000 or more (the rate typically regarded as the rural rate) can be examined. This rate rose throughout the 1950s, reaching a peak in 1961 (see Aoki [1967, P. 44] ). coefficient of the no-education variable for females and a negative bias to the estimate of the coefficient of the no-education variable for males, These biases could be quite substantial and might account for Hashimoto's interesting results.
Unlike the completed-fertility regressions, Hashimoto's regressions reported in table 9 deal entirely with postwar reproductive activities and specifically with 1960 live births. The education variables in these regressions refer to the entire (over age. 15) prefectural population. Unfortunately, virtually the entire interprefectural variation in the proportion in the no-education variables relates to the experience of age cohorts that in 1960 were well beyond their reproductive years! I do not doubt that, inspired by Leibowitz's paper in this volume, work can be done on how a mother's education affects a daughter's fertility, but this is not the hypothesis in question.'1 Also with respect to these same regressions, I am a bit puzzled by the use of the logarithm of earnings rather than arithmetic earnings. I suspect one gets a higher t-statistic on female wages when this form is used, but when using what should be thought of as grouped data, I am unsure of the theoretical justification.
In concluding my remarks, I would like to offer a suggestion for future research. Notwithstanding Hashimoto's very useful analysis, I do not find the postwar period to be the most interesting stretch of Japanese demographic history. While there are many instances of fertility decline in the context of rapid economic growth, the experience of Japan between 1875 and 1920 appears to be unique. There was rapid economic growth starting from a relatively high income base, a declining agricultural labor force, a revolution in female education coexisting with a high and, as recent research indicates, very likely a rising level of fertility.'2 Further, in view of the Japanese experience after 1920, I
Nationwide, 82 percent of men with no education and 96 percent of women with no education came from the age groups 50 and older and 40 and older, respectively. The simple correlation by prefecture for never-educated men above age 50 and younger than age 50 is .25. The simple correlation by prefecture for never-educated women above and below age 40 is .21.
52 The official statistics collected for Japan suggest rising fertility throughout most of this period. These statistics have been traditionaUy treated with considerable skepticism on account of underreporting in the earliest periods. Taeuber, in analyzing these statistics, suggests that fertility probably rose substantially during the first part of this period and subsequently declined slowly (see Taeuber [1958, pp. 52-54] ). Estimates which allow for the traditional criticisms of the official statistics have been prepared by Okazaki (1965) . Okazaki estimates that the Japanese population in 1875 was almost 2 million above the official statistics. More recently, Akasaka Keiko has provided another series of alternative estimates. Somewhat surprisingly, in view of the earlier criticisms, she finds that the official statistics overestimate population by 600,000 in 1875 and understate the rate of population growth at least through 1910. For Akasaka's estimates, see Hitotsubashi University Institute of Economic Research (1968) . For an informative discussion of the alternative estimates, see Umemura (1969). would submit that this episode constitutes a fascinating and important puzzle for those who would stress the role of economic factors in general, and the cost of time, in particular, in the explanation of fertility history.
